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N AUSTRALIA, the intervention of the legislature in labor relations
and industrial disputes has long been accepted as a postulate of political life. Of course there is frequent disagreement as to the precise
method or principle of legislative interference, which is not surprising in
view of the fact that the two principal political parties of the country are
closely associated with organized employer groups on the one hand and
employee groups on the other. None the less, in no portion of the Commonwealth does anyone seriously advocate the principle of laissez faire
in labor relations.
It was not always so. Prior to the decade commencing in 189o, trade
unionism had not been developed either on any national basis or to any
considerable extent in any of the then separate colonies. Similarly, the
employing classes felt no need for close organization to protect their interests. At the time there were in Australia six self governing colonies acting
independently of each other. Federation was not to come until 19oi.
Heavy overseas borrowing, failure either to use agricultural land profitably or to build up secondary industries, inadequate direct taxation, and
above all serious collapses in the price of the staple product, wool, all
helped to cause a period of acute depression. Almost inevitably, the
employers made proposals to reduce wages and a series of great strikes
and lockouts at once followed. The working classes were poorly organ,
ized for the struggle and were soon defeated. Politicians advised the trade
unionists that they should seek representation in the legislature instead
of resorting to direct action. In the key colony of New South Wales, the
advice, whether sincere or not, was at once acted upon and a political
labor party was organized. Its supporters soon extended beyond trade
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unionists and it obtained such successes that between 189i and 19o4 it
held the balance of power between the two main political parties, viz., the
free-trade (or direct taxation) party and the protectionist (or indirect
taxation) party. The Labor party adopted the technique of extorting
concessions from one party in return for its support and for this purpose
its members "sunk the fiscal issue." On the whole, the Labor party was
successful in its objects. Amongst other demands it obtained direct taxation on land values, the enactment of workshops and factories legislation,
coal mines regulation, early dosing of shops, additional direct taxation,
navigation regulation, old age pensions, and miners' accident relief. As it
has turned out, the most far reaching of the legislation it obtained was
that relating to the compulsory settlement of disputes between employers
and employees.
First of all, in 1899, an act was passed in New South Wales empowering the government, in cases of trade disputes where attempts at amicable
settlement had failed, to direct an investigation "into the causes and circumstances of the dispute." All such enquiries were to be conducted by
a judge of one or other of the superior courts of the State. Under this
act the parties to the trade dispute might agree to have their differences
settled by an arbitrator. In that case compulsory effect could be given to
the award; but, except by such agreement, all the enquiries under the act
were merely to inform public opinion as to the causes of the dispute.
There was ample power to enforce the attendance of witnesses for the purposes of the enquiry, but (except prior agreement) no other compulsive
element was contained in the act.
The act was almost a dead letter, neither the trade unions nor the
employers being anxious to bear the heavy costs of long investigations
without any guarantee that effect would be given to the tribunal's
opinion. The Labor party still pressed upon the New South Wales
government its demands for compulsory arbitration, and in i9oi, the
first Industrial Arbitration Act was passed.
This was the first Australian act which efficiently provided not only for
compulsory investigation of industrial disputes before a permanent
tribunal, but also for the enforcement of its awards and orders. The act
has been so much copied that its main provisions should be referred to.
The tribunal set up was called the Court of Industrial Arbitration and
consisted of a supreme court judge as president and two additional members-both appointed by the government and representative of employer
and employee interests respectively. All appointments were of three years
duration. The court's main function was to hear and settle "industrial
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disputes," and, by definition, such disputes could arise only as between
employers on the one part, and an industrial union of employees or trade
union on the other part. In New South Wales trade unions had been in
existence long before the act and, under its terms, a trade union could become registered before the court as an industrial union, whereupon it
could initiate proceedings for the settlement of a dispute. The court was
empowered to prescribe in its award a minimum rate of wages, and also
to direct preference of employment to unionists; but this preference was
only at the point of engagement and "other things being equal." The
court's jurisdiction extended to the cancellation of the registration of an
industrial union, e.g., in cases where the union had wilfully disobeyed an
order of the court.
Although the tribunal appointed to hear and settle the disputes was
called a court and its chairman was a supreme court judge, and although
it enforced its own orders by fine, etc., it was in the main an administrative
body. There was no appeal from its decisions. So far did the legislature
go in preventing intereference by the Supreme Court with the industrial
arbitration tribunal that Section 32 provided:
Proceedings in the court shall not be removable to any other court by certiorarior
otherwise; and no award, order, or proceeding of the court shall be vitiated by reason
only of any informality or want of form or be liable to be challenged, appealed against,
reviewed, quashed, or called in question by any court of judicature on any account
whatsoever.'
In spite of this very clear expression of the legislative will, the Supreme
Court of New South Wales frequently yielded to the temptation of intermeddling with the orders and awards of the industrial court. As the common law writ of prohibition and the word "jurisdiction" were not mentioned in Section 32, the Supreme Court held that a writ of prohibition
could issue in cases of excess of jurisdiction. In particular the Supreme
Court insisted that the existence of an industrial dispute was an essential
preliminary to the tribunal's jurisdiction and that wherever the industrial unions had failed to establish this condition, e.g., by failing to demand improved conditions from the employers and to secure a formal refusal before approaching the industrial court, the awards obtained were
invalid for want of jurisdiction; although many months may have been
spent in the hearing of the merits of the dispute. Further, the High
xAct No. 59 of I9OI § 32. Cf. § io (e) of the National Labor Relations Act of the U.S., 49
Stat. 390 (i935),

29

U.S.C.A. § 16o (e) (Supp. 1938), which, instead of giving the National

Labor Relations Board's decisions finality, seems almost to invite their review on the facts by
the circuit court of appeals and which assimilates the findings of the Board to findings of a
jury which may be set aside unless supported by evidence.
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Court of Australia held (on appeal from the Supreme Court of New
South Wales) that the industrial court of that State had no power to
make a general order that a particular code of wages and conditions of
labor deliberately adopted by agreement between the registered organizations of employers and employees should be in force throughout the
industry. So disgusted was Judge Heydon, the second president of the
court, with the disastrous effect such jurisdictional reviews were having
upon the smooth administration of the act that he said:
The barque of the Industrial Arbitration Act made a brave show with sails and
bunting at its launching and when directed by my predecessor. His captaincy speaks
for itself; but since I took the helm, the Act has been riddled and shelled, broken fore
and aft and reduced to a sinking hulk. No pilot could navigate such a craft. Do not
say, however, that no ship can sail the seas, because this one has been so badly built.2
The act of igoi also provided that strikes or lockouts should be
penalized if they took place, either (i) before a reasonable time had
elapsed for a reference to the industrial court of the matter in dispute, or
(2) during the pendency of any proceedings in the court. Leave of the
court had to be obtained before a prosecution could be begun. It appeared that, as soon as the industrial court proceedings were concluded,
and the award pronounced, the statutory prohibition against strike or
lockout ceased. But as a general rule, the trade unions were content to enforce the terms of the court's award by prosecution, e.g., in the case of
failure to pay the minimum wage. In some of the later statutes, both
State and Commonwealth, strikes and lockouts were prohibited irrespective of the time at which and the circumstances in which they began.
Indeed, in some awards, made under the sanction of the Commonwealth
statute, penalties were provided in case of any combination of employees
to refuse work although no engagements to accept work had yet been
made, and although the refusal was not unreasonable in the circumstances. Provisions such as these, though rarely inserted, amounted to
enforcing something like a servile status and on that account were strongly
condemned by Mr. justice Higgins of the Federal Court of Arbitration.
It is important to understand the attitude of the political Labor party
towards the New South Wales Act of i9oi. For nearly ten years prior
to its passage, economic depression had curbed the spirit and lessened
the power of the trade unions. Almost every lockout directed against
them had succeeded, almost every strike had failed. W. A. Holman, one
of Labor'S ablest spokesmen, and later premier of the State, in supporting
2New South Wales Parliamentary Papers, Report of Royal Comm'n on Industrial Arbitra-

tion xxvi (1913).
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the introduction of the act, thus referred to one of the great strikes in
the wool industry:
Who was responsible for the gigantic shearing strike of 1894?-for the breach of
an agreement which had been in force since i89i, and worked most harmoniously for
three years? What was the position of the union under those circumstances? They
appealed to a deaf heaven for justice. They had their agreement, and there it was-so
much waste paper, the employers disregarding it and offering a new one. We-I was
then a member of the Shearers' Union, although not a shearer-we had then absolutely
no resource but to appeal to the god of battles-we appealed, and the union went down
in the fight. But had there been a Court of this kind, and that agreement in force,
there would have been no strike, none of the shearing riots of 1894.3
Holman thus justified the principle of the new legislation:
All that the passing of the bill will do is to substitute the methods of reason, arbitration, common sense, and judgment for the methods of brute force. The bill will substitute the force of the law, which, in its ultimate analysis, is the regulated brute force
of the community, for unregulated brute force; and that is what every piece of legislation does.4
In spite of the frequent issue of writs of prohibition against the industrial court, the Labor movement in New South Wales was not dissatisfied
with the results obtained. There was considerable improvement in working conditions, particularly in women's trades and "soft collar" occupations. There was also a great increase in union membership which in turn
helped the growth in power of the political Labor movement.
Prior to federation, sweating became so rife in the neighbouring colony

of Victoria that by an act passed in i896 wage fixing authorities called
Wages Boards were established with power to fix minimum wages in a
limited number of trades. The main distinctions between this system
(which still continues in the State of Victoria though subject to the
superior jurisdiction of the Federal Arbitration Court) and that introduced by the New South Wales act of igoi may be thus described:
i The wages board system merely extended the principle of factory legislation so

as to minimize sweating which was regarded as obnoxious to decent factory conditions.
2. Although subsequently extended to most trades, the system operated at first only
in relation to the clothing trade, the boot trade, furniture making and bread baking.
3. The wages boards had not general jurisdiction over industrial claims or disputes
between unions and employers, whereas in New South Wales, the subject matter of
the court's jurisdiction extended to every industrial claim or matter which was bona
fide in dispute.
4. Under the wages board system the unions had no power to enforce the determination of the wages boards. The maximum wage fixed was equally applicable to nonunionists and enforcement lay exclusively in the hands of the government factory
inspector-.
3

New South Wales Parliamentary Debates (Aug. 23, 1goo).

4 Ibid.
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The result was not surprising. In Victoria, trade unionism did not increase in strength as it did in New South Wales. The trade unions were
most interested in policing or enforcing the wages boards' determinations
and yet they were given no authority to prosecute. The chief inspector
of factories in Victoria was almost in despair at his inability to enforce
the determinations of the Boards:
It is notorious that some of the men, who are quite able to earn the minimum wage,
and are no doubt actually earning more than that sum for their employers, sign for
the minimum wage and take less. I have had .... repeated admission from men that
they have done it. Prosecutions have been taken fot these breaches, and taken successfully. It is, however, very difficult to get sufficient evidence for such prosecutions.
Most undoubted evidence of fraud is necessary, for, if men were allowed to sign for
wages and then simply deny receiving them, our whole commercial system would be
rendered unstable and no one would be safe. Why do they do it? Because they are
afraid of not getting work, because they know that there are men at the door of the
factory probably waiting for any chance to take their places, because they know that
there are old and slow workers who are willing to take any wage and sign anything
if they can only get work.s
The ultimate reason why the New South Wales union movement prospered rapidly and that in Victoria did not, was mainly political. In New
South Wales, the Labor party was able to extract favorable legislation
from a government which was compelled to rely upon its support. In turn
the growing strength of unionism itself precluded attempts to interfere
with the privileged position unionists were obtaining under the industrial
court system. Thus, in 19o8, by which time the New South Wales Labor
party had become the direct opposition and was no longer merely a third
party, a Conservative government was intent upon adopting the wages
board system of Victoria instead of the system established by the New
South Wales act of i9o. But the Labor party succeeded in retaining the
principle that the recognized unit of the employees both in the hearing
of the disputes and in the enforcement of the awards when made should
be the trade union (in its capacity of industrial union). Subsequently, in
spite of changes of government and frequent amendments of the industrial

arbitration law, no serious attempt has been made to undermine this
fundamental principle.
I next turn to the intervention of the national legislature in connection
with labor disputes. Formed in 19o, the Commonwealth of Australia
was a true federation modelled in great part upon the Constitution of
the United States. There were of course some important points of difference. In Australia, the constitutional guaranties inserted were not so exs Report of Inspector of Factories 12, 14 (x898).
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tensive. Although interstate free trade, religious freedom and trial by
jury were safeguarded in specific terms, the founders of the constitution
were so impressed with the vagueness and uncertainty of the "due
process" clause as interpreted in the United States that no serious proposal was made to include any provision that could be regarded as
analogous. For present purposes the main provisions affecting the division
of legislative power as between the Commonwealth and the six States
comprising the Federation, were the following:
SECTION I. The Legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a
Federal Parliament, which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of Representatives, and which is hereinafter called "The Parliament," or "The Parliament of

the Commonwealth."
SEc. 51. The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make
laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:
(i) Trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States

(xxxv) Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial
disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State.
(xxxix) Matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by this Constitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in the Government of
the Commonwealth, or in the Federal Judicature, or in any department or
officer of the Commonwealth.
SEc. 61. The Executfre power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and
is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, and extends to
the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Common-

wealth.
SEC. 71. The Judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal
Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, and in such other federal
courts as the Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal
jurisdiction. The High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice, and so many other
Justices, not less than two, as the Parliament prescribes.
SEC. 107. Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes
a State, shall, unless it is by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of
the Commonwealth, or withdrawn from the Parliament of the State, continue as at
the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission of the State, as the
case may be.
SEC. iog. When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth,
the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be
invalid.

Of the thirty-nine heads of Commonwealth legislative power mentioned

in Section 51, I have set out only three in the above list of provisions.
None of the thirty-nine include "labor," "employment," "wage fixation"
or "industry." The only reference to labor or industry is in subsection
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(xxxv) describing the Commonwealth legislative power in relation to
conciliation and arbitration for the settlement of certain industrial
disputes,
So far as the control of labor relations is concerned, the general result
admitted of no doubt. Over such topic, the legislative powers of the
States, plenary within their borders prior to Federation, were not withdrawn. Further, except so far as the constitution conferred a subject
matter of power upon the new Commonwealth legislature, that legislature could not act at all. Even where the Commonwealth Parliament was
empowered to act under Section 51, primafadie each State legislature retained concurrent power to act subject only to Section 1O9 which provided for the supremacy of Commonwealth legislation in event of actual
conflict between it and State legislation.' Thus in relation to labor matters
the States continued to have power to control within their own borders
questions of hours, wages, conditions of labor, the status of trade unions
and the like matters.
It is interesting to recall that the clause from which Section 5I (xxxv)
derives was included in the draft Australian constitution at a late moment in the proceedings of the drafting convention. The inclusion was
due to the insistence of H. B. Higgins who was later to become Mr.
Justice Higgins, the second president of the Commonwealth Arbitration
Court which was established in exercise of the Commonwealth legislative
power. When Higgins' suggestion was adopted, very few members of the
Convention expected that very early in its history the Commonwealth
Parliament would follow the example of New South Wales in its industrial arbitration experiment. To the great surprise of all, the Labor
party was successful in electing sufficient members of the first Commonwealth Parliament to enable it to hold the balance of power between the
protectionist and free trade groups. Then, at the general election of 19o3,
the Labor party increased its following, and, until the year 19o9, when
its opponents coalesced and Labor became the sole opposition party, it
retained the balance of power and exercised it to obtain concessions in
accordance with the modus operandi already perfected in New South
Wales. The most important result of its policy of "concessions in return
for support" was the passing in 1904 of the Commonwealth Conciliation
and Arbitration Act in exercise of the legislative power specified in Section
5i (xxxv) of the constitution.
The Commonwealth act provided that a court of conciliation and arbi6 There are a number of legislative powers of the Commonwealth Parliament which are
made exclusive under § 52, but they need not be referred to here.
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tration should be established. The tribunal was to consist of a president
appointed for seven years from among the justices of the High Court and
the president could from time to time appoint a deputy president from
among the High Court justices or the Supreme Court judges of any
State. The first president was Mr. Justice O'Connor. Then from 1907
until 1920, Mr. Justice Higgins held the office of president. During the
latter portion of his term of office, his deputy was Mr. Justice Powers, also
a High Court justice. After Justice Higgins' retirement, other deputy
presidents were appointed, until, in 1926, the arbitration system was
altered by providing that judges of the court should have strict federal
judicial tenure (life appointments). The first chief judge under the new
system was Judge Dethridge, who held office from 1926 until his death
early in the present year.
In the first act of 1904 the court was empowered to settle industrial
disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State (except in relation
to agricultural, viticultural, horticultural, and dairying pursuits). By subsequent acts the jurisdiction extended to all such interstate disputes
without any exceptions. Awards were made enforceable at the instance
of any registered organization or its members. The essentially administrative character of the tribunal was evidenced by Section 25 of the 1904
act which provided:
In the hearing and determination of every industrial dispute the Court shall act
according to equity, good conscience, and the substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms, and shall not be bound by any rules of evidence,
but may inform its mind on any matter in such manner as it thinks just.
Despite many amendments in the Commonwealth statute, its main
line of development is unbroken. As in the case of the New South Wales
act of igoi, and the later New South Wales act of 1912, trade unions
alone could initiate court proceedings on behalf of employees. When
registered under the act the trade unions became "registered organizations" for the employees, and the act also provided for organizations for
employers. In practice it was quite impossible for a "company union"
to become registered as an employees' organization. After an industrial
dispute had come into existence, any registered organization could bring
it into court for adjudication. By subsequent legislation, the president
of the court was enabled to summon all persons interested in the dispute
to a "compulsory conference" in order to exhaust the method of conciliation. Failing agreement at such a conference, or after an organization had
itself brought the dispute into court, the president heard evidence. In the
early days of the court, when first awards were being made in an industry,
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these public hearings occupied considerable time. The arbitrator's
decision was always embodied in an award.
As a rule, the award contained four separate parts:
a) Hours.-The arbitrator would determine the hours of labor (usually on a weekly basis) and suitable increased overtime rates. Very early
in the court's history, forty-eight hours became the standard working
week. Later the forty-four hour standard was accepted.
b) Basic wage.-This was the wage which had to be paid to every
adult worker whatever his degree of skill. One of Mr. justice Higgins'
greatest contributions was his declaration that the "basic wage," that is
"enough wages to enable a worker to maintain his existence with its
normal necessary wants" was a minimum standard and was absolutely
irreducible.7 This wage was fixed by an investigation of the normal requirements of an average family (husband, wife and three children) living
according to a reasonable standard of comforts. Higgins J. made his first
investigation of the "basic wage" in what was called the "Harvester Wage
Enquiry" in 1907 at which time he fixed seven shillings a day, or fortytwo shillings a week as a reasonable base rate.
Gradually the court devised an elaborate method of adjusting the basic
wage in accordance with the rise and fall of the cost of living. The central
statistical bureau of the Commonwealth regularly obtains particulars of
prices and for. each quarter issues index figures which show the rise or fall
in the cost of living for (say) (i) rents, (2) clothing, (3) food, (4) miscellaneous elements, and (5) various combinations of the other four elements.
The basic wage is adjusted upon the basis of the data thus obtained. In
this way, the nominal basic wage may alter from quarter to quarter but
the real wage, representing the necessary commodities actually purchasable, remains substantially unchanged until the court decides to alter
the general basic wage or to adjust it by some different calculus. The present practice is that neither the basic wage nor the method of calculating
it can be altered except by three judges of the federal court.
c) Marginal allowance.-This allowance consisted of the additional
wage in excess of the irreducible minimum (i.e., the basic wage). The
actual wage to be paid in any case was calculated by adding the basic
wage to the marginal allowance applicable to the classification or grade of
the particular worker. From the first the court regarded it as important
to separate the "marginal allowance" from the "basic wage." Whereas
the latter standard could not be decreased, Mr. Justice Higgins held that
7 Higgins, Industrial Arbitration io.
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he was at liberty to alter the marginal allowance according to the economic success or otherwise of the particular industry. Thus he said:
The remuneration of the employee cannot be allowed to depend on the profits made
by his individual employer. This proposition does not mean that the possible profits
or returns of the industry as a whole are never to be taken into account in settling the
wages. So long as every employee gets a living wage, I can well understand that workmen of skill might consent to work in such a case for less than their proper wages, not
only to get present employment, but in order to assist an enterprise which will afford
them and their comrades more opportunities for employment hereafter. For this purpose, it is advisable to make the demarcation as clear and as definite as possible between that part of the wages which is due to skill, or to monopoly, or to other considerations. Unless great multitudes of people are to be irretrievably injured in themselves and in their families, unless society is to be perpetually in industrial unrest, it is
necessary to keep this living wage as a thing sacrosanct, beyond the reach of bargaining. But where the skilled worker has secured a living wage, he has attained nearly
to a contractual level with the employer and, with caution, bargaining may be allowed
to operate. 8
d) Industrial conditlions.-These conditions dealt with the general
regulation of the relations between employer and employee so far as
relevant to the industrial dispute before the court. The award could, and
did, cover such matters as preference to unionists, privileges of employees,
requirement of notice of termination of employment, methods of classification of employees, setting up of boards of reference to deal with minor
matters in the working out of the awards.
Although an award, when first made or subsequently consolidated,
usually included the four main matters which I have described, the court
had power to vary the award. But it could not, by variation, insert any
provision which was "outside the ambit" of, i.e., irrelevant to, the settlement of the industrial dispute of which the court had cognizance. In
other words the court had no general authority to order what was just or
fair unless there had been a demand which warranted such order.
This brings me to the great difficulties encountered by the Commonwealth arbitration court (immediately after its presidency had been taken
over by Mr. justice Higgins) in resisting the many legal and constitutional
attacks which the employers conducted in the High Court. In the United
States, similar legal attacks have been made, but there they were almost
invited by the terms of the National Labor Relations Act itself which
confers upon certain courts exercising the judicial power of the United
States a fairly wide supervisory jurisdiction over the administrative
tribunal. In Australia every effort was made by the legislature to confer
8 Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order

143, I44 (1922).
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complete autonomy upon the administrative tribunal. The example of
New South Wales was followed, Section 31, Commonwealth act of 19o4
providing that "no award of the court shall be challenged, appealed
against, reviewed, quashed, or called in question in any other court on
any account whatever." All right of appeal was excluded. By a later
act it was expressly provided that no award of the court should be "subject to prohibition, mandamus, or injunction." But the High Court, then
under the chief justiceship of Sir Samuel Griffith-regarded by many as
a pronounced exponent of "State rights"-continued to act on the thesis
that the constitution itself authorized the High Court to keep inferior
federal tribunals within their jurisdiction by issuing any "prohibition"
order deemed necessary. The fact that in making its award the Arbitration tribunal exercised a purely administrative jurisdiction did not prevent the frequent issue of writs of prohibition. One competent observer
has stated:
Writs of prohibition and mandamus were taken out against the Court and its
President almost as a matter of course after each award. Many cases were stated fdr
the High Court. Mr. Justice Higgins was the most prohibited man in the Commonwealth. The law reports are full of cases arising out of the Court's work. The workers
won awards only to see them quashed or overthrown on some legal technicality. Almost every word in Sec. 5, par. (xxxv) of the Constitution has been the subject of interminable litigation and almost every section of the Arbitration Act also. The cost
both to employer and employee must have amounted to hundreds of thousands of
pounds. This legal conflict recalls the earlier fight of the workers for the recognition
of their unions and like that fight seems now to have ended. It is another illustration
of the working class struggle.9

Higgins himself had to make public complaint against the High
Court's bombardment of his court:
At present the approach to the Court is through a veritable Serbonian bog of
technicalities; and the bog is extending. After full consideration, I must state it as my
opinion that these decisions as to the limits of the Court's power, with all the corollaries which they involve, will make it impracticable to frame awards that will workwill entail indeed, a gradual paralysis of the functions of the Court. Yet this Court, if
it be trusted-and unless it can be trusted, it ought not to exist-shows magnificent
promise of usefulness to the public. It is in a position to solve problems which cannot
be solved, to settle disputes which cannot be settled by any tribunal except one that
has authority in all parts of Australia. In this very case, in my reasons for award, I
showed that in industries as to which there is inter-State competition, the State Wages
Boards confessedly cannot do justice. It would not be well to go into further detail on
this subject, for obvious reasons. But I am clearly entitled-I am even in duty bound
-to make known the obstacles and dangers which confront the Court, and before it
is too late.o
9 Foster, Working Class Standards

20.

'0 4 CA.R. 42.
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At a much later stage in the court's history Higgins wrote:
But the attacks on the Court and its awards are, of course, generally made from
the side of employers, many of whom naturally resent any curtailment of their powers.

The applications for prohibition against the President have been sometimes in part or
temporarily successful. Prohibition is applied for because of some alleged excess of the
Court's jurisdiction, and the argument generally turns on the question, was there a

dispute, and if there was, did it extend beyond one State? Sometimes the argument
turns on the validity of some section of the Act. The proceedings in the High Court
are very long and very costly, and it is astonishing what a wealth of learning is involved
in the meaning of the word "dispute" and the words "extending beyond the limits of
one State." x
Looking back at the cases from the vantage point of a later generation,
one might be amazed at the regularity and persistency with which the
awards of the court were assailed, except for the fact that similar attacks
characterized the New South Wales tribunal and seemed to be part of a
general scheme for discrediting an institution which the employers regarded as threatening their unrestricted economic power. Higgins complained of the "intense strain and partisan abuse" to which he had been
'
but he should not have been overpowered with surprise after
subjected,12
he had openly proclaimed that his court was "an instrument for raising
the downtrodden and for improving the stamina and character of the
coming generation." 3 Throughout, Higgins was inspired by the ideal
that through the gradual substitution of arbitration for the weapons of
strike and lockout he was extending the province of law and order to a
new field. "I had," he said, "to learn the business, with no book of instructions, no teacher other than experience, no kindly light except from
the pole star of justice."'14 At times Higgins was also assailed from the
side of the trade unions' s and his extreme caution in improving existing
standards led to the doggerel (sung to the tune of Yankee Doodle):
I know the Arbitration Act,
As a sailor does his "riggins,"
So if you want a small advance
I'll talk to Justice 'Iggins.

A present day student is almost bound to conclude that the difficulties
once raised as to the construction of the Commonwealth legislative power
over industrial arbitration were greatly exaggerated and over-elaborated,
But some consideration of the points of law is I think of value.
By Section 51 (xxxv) Parliament could make laws with respect to "con" Higgins, op. cit. supra note 8, at
12 Id. at 175.

29.

"Higgins, op. cit. supra note 7, at 5.

Higgins, op. cit. supra note 8, at v.
ISId. at 28.
'4
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ciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial
disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State." It was clear
enough that Parliament itself had no power to decree what wages and conditions of workers should be, but was compelled to allow such matters to
be dealt with only by way of conciliation or arbitration. This restriction
Parliament recognized, for it never attempted to do much more than set
up an administrative tribunal to arbitrate in default of conciliation.
But the word "arbitrate" was subjected to acute and subtle analysis.
To "arbitrate" (it was said) was impossible unless there were parties to
the "industrial dispute" and all such parties were before the arbitration
tribunal. Therefore it was held that the court could not be empowered
by Parliament to make its awards binding except upon the parties before
it. The trade union was thus compelled to prove that it was in dispute as
to terms and conditions of labor with every employer in Australia whom
it wished to be bound by the court's award. If, for instance, it made its
demands upon ninety-seven employers only when there were ioo employers in the industry, and if each of the ninety-seven employers rejected
the union's demands, it was held that the arbitrator could not, incidentally to his award, require the remaining three employers to observe the
terms of the award. In industries which included thousands of employees,
the difficulty this created was very great.
An alternative view was that an "industrial dispute" bears little or no
resemblance to an ordinary civil dispute and that Parliament's constitutional power extended to authorizing the arbitrator to safeguard his
award against minor evasions and discriminations by making its terms a
"common rule" of the relevant industry. But this view was summarily rejected. In practice this led to enormous expense and delay for the unions
were compelled to seek out every runaway employer in the country in
order to serve him with its "log" or code of demands and to get from him
a refusal to accede to such demands.,6
Then came the cases determining what was the true criterion of "industrial" in the phrase "industrial dispute." It was held that "industrial
dispute" means something more than a dispute between employer and
employee-there must be something affecting the conduct of an "industry." Thus, disputes extending beyond the limits of one State between
teachers and their employers are deemed outside the jurisdiction of the
court, whereas in the case of employment in the services of insurance and
banking a sufficient "industrial" character is deemed to adhere to the
insurance and banking clerks.
xWhybrow's Case, ii C.L.R. i (igio).
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Further the dispute must be a "genuine" dispute. In many cases the
jurisdiction of the arbitration court was denied by the High Court upon
the ground that, in the circumstances of the particular case, all that the
trade union had done was to invoke the federal court's jurisdiction without
creating a dispute. But the High Court always refrained from asserting
that in order to create a bonacfide or genuine dispute there must be strike,
lockout, or industrial disturbance. Indeed one of the supposed objects of
the federal act was to prevent strikes and lockouts. The court marked
time near or about its declaration that there must be something more
than a mere demand for better conditions followed by refusal on the part
of the employers in order to create a dispute. How much more, no one
quite knew. In more recent times, the principle acted upon is that, so long
as the demands are authenticated as the deliberate expression of the will
of the union, refusal of the demand is sufficient to attract the jurisdiction
7
of the court.
A problem arose over the concept of an industrial dispute "extending
beyond the limits of any one State." Was the concept merely geographical? For a considerable time it was believed that where there was no
nexus between similar industrial operations conducted by employers in
two States there could be no single dispute covering the two States. Thus,
in the trade of building, there was no competition between the trade
operations in Sydney and Melbourne which are distant more than five
hundred miles from each other. In the end the High Court held that the
constitutional definition was satisfied if, in two or more States, the unionists were making common cause to improve their conditions, even though
the employers in one State were not concerned or affected by the8 wages
paid in the other States and there was no interstate competition.
Later, the court seemed almost to accept the principle that where there
was a very close nexus between the wage standards in two States there
were special obstacles in creating an interstate dispute. In one State a
trade union was resisting a lockout which was designed to lower wages and
which if successful would have immediately reduced the wage standard
for the members of the same union throughout Australia. But it was held
that the dispute had not extended and could not be extended beyond the
State where the lockout was in progress although that State was in effect
the selected battleground of the Australian employees and employers. 9
17Australian Tramway and Motor Omnibus Employees' Ass'n v. Comm'r of Road Transport and Tramways, 58 C.L.R. 436 (N.S.W. 1938).
isBuilders' Labourers' Case, i8 C.L.R. 224 (1914).
,9Caledonian Collieries, Ltd. v. The Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation
42 C.L.R. 527 (1930).
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A question of vital importance arose in connection with the industrial
activities of some of the State governments in industries which in other
countries and in Australia itself are also controlled by private capitalists.
Where in such industries disputes arose between the States or their instrumentalities and the workers, could the federal arbitration court make
an award binding the State in relation to its industrial operations, e.g.,
State railways, tramways, engineering shops, timber cutting? At first the
High Court said no, 2° basing itself upon McCulloch v. Maryland- and
Collector v. Day.2 2 Ten or fifteen years later, a contrary view was taken in
the Engineers' case.23 There has been much comment on the Engineers'
case 24 but in essence the point was extremely simple. Undoubtedly the
State governments concerned were parties to an industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of one State. There was nothing in the constitution
or the Commonwealth act which precluded the Commonwealth arbitrator
from settling every dispute of such character. If the States could not have
been bound along with the other employer parties, then there could have
been no settlement of the one industrial dispute in which all such employers including the States were concerned. It was therefore held that just as
the Commonwealth can subject to customs duties goods imported by the
State government, its arbitrator can bind State governments which are
parties to industrial disputes. It is not surprising that as to the word
"bind" the court used somewhat vague language and it did not discuss
what would happen if the States refused to provide moneys to pay the
wages awarded.21
Another problem of crucial importance was whether, and to what extent, the arbitration court could at the instance of a trade union disputant
prescribe the duties of employers who were parties to a dispute to persons
(e.g., non-unionists) who were not parties to the dispute. For some considerable time the view-prevailed that, even though employers were paying non-unionist employees less than the union standard wage, and although such practice was ruinous to the unions' maintenance of standards,
there could be no dispute between the union and the employers as to
whether the nonk-unionists also should be paid in accordance with the
union standard. The unions did not contend that the non-unionists themselves were parties to the industrial dispute, but they did contend that the
employers who were undoubtedly parties to the dispute with the union
could and should be made to comply with the unions' demand.
2o Railway
21 4

Servants' Case, 4 C.L.R. 488 (igo6).

Wheat. (U.S.) 316 (i8ig).

23

28 C.L.R.

129

(1920).

" xI Wall. (U.S.) 113 (1870).
24Ibd.
2SAustralian Rys. Union v. The Victorian Rys. Comm'rs, 44 C.L.R. 319 (1930).
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Ultimately the unions' contention prevailed. 6 Students of this subject
will readily observe that, in principle, there is no difference between this
type of dispute and the classical dispute caused by a demand of preference
to unionists. In the latter case the fact that those who are not parties to
the dispute (the non-unionists) may be disadvantaged as the union is
advantaged by gaining its demand does not prevent the subject matter in
question from being the subject of dispute between union and employers.
In the former case, the fact that those who are not parties to the dispute
(the non-unionists) may incidentally obtain advantage if the employer is
compelled to pay them in accordance with the union standard should have
no greater effect.
Until eight years ago, the Commonwealth act contained provisions
penalizing all persons concerned in strikes and lockouts in relation to industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of one State and in relation
to the terms of the court's award. These penal provisions were frequently
enforced, and the High Court gave a very broad construction to the constitutional power so far as penalty provisions were concerned.27
Few, if any, cases of lockouts come within the notice of the courts. For
this and other reasons, the penal provisions became decidedly unpopular,
and, in 1931, most of them were, without any serious dissent, swept out
of the statute by a Labor government. The main sanction against open
defiance of the Court's orders by an organization of employers or employees is cancellation of registration, which means effective deprivation
of the advantages of the act during the period of cancellation.
Questions frequently arose as to the legal position created where a
federal award prescribing hours, wages, and conditions differed from those
laid down either by the law of a State or by an award of a State industrial
tribunal. One view which for a time threatened to prevail was that "arbitration" connoted settlement having regard to the existing law, and as
the existing law was that of the State, no federal award could prevail over
an inconsistent State law. But the opinion which has been accepted is
that, as the award of the federal arbitrator is given by the act the force and
efficacy of a Commonwealth statute, and as Section 1o9 of the constitution gives Commonwealth statutes superiority over State laws in cases of
inconsistency, the superior law resolving any conflict as to hours, wages,
etc., is to be discovered in the terms of the federal award. This result can
be and was stated rhetorically by declaring that a decision of the federal
arbitrator over whom the federal Parliament has no control can override
the established social policy of a State, e.g., as to standard hours for work.
26

17

The Metal Trades Case, 54 C.L.R. 387 (1935).
Stemp's Case, 23 C.L.R. 226 (1917); Walsh v. Sainsbury, 36 C.L.R. 464

(1925).
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In one great case, the State of New South Wales had itself prescribed a
standard of forty-four hours at a time when the federal standard was
forty-eight. It was argued that as the federal award prescribed a Maximem
of forty-eight hours, it was quite consistent with such command that the
State law should prescribe a working week of forty-four hours. But this
argument was rejected in Cowburn's case.28
In practice it is extremely difficult for the workers to obtain a shorter
working week from the federal arbitrator. Some governments declare that
the question of what is a fair working week should always be left to industrial tribunals and never determined by Parliament. On the other hand,
many industrial judges are very chary of acting without some expression
of opinion from the legislature.29 Cowburn's case, 0 already referred to,
,prevents the States from directly prescribing a shorter working week
which can bind employers of that State in relation to workers governed by
federal awards-comprising more than fifty per cent of the organized
workers of the Commonwealth. The State governments can pass legislation which provides for a shorter working week for workers within their
borders who are not governed by federal awards.3' But a State which
thus enacts a shorter working week may expose itself to increased competition from a "low wage" State.
In 1920 the Labor government of New South Wales reduced the standard working week from forty-eight to forty-four hours. Soon after, in November

1920,

Mr. Justice Higgins indicated that the forty-four hours

32
standard would probably be adopted by the Commonwealth court.
When, however, Mr. Justice Higgins was about to consider the application
of the shorter working week to the important engineering industry, the
federal Parliament intervened and cut the ground from under his feet by
providing that the existing standard of forty-eight hours could only be
reduced by a majority of the three existing arbitrators. Undoubtedly the
30 37 C.L.R. 466 (1926).
29 Higgins, op. cit. suf'ra note 7, at 6.
2S 37 C.L.R. 466 (1926).
31Inasmuch as a federal award can only be made in relation to a dispute extending beyond
the limits of any one state, the wage conditions in industries which are confined to one state
are not as a general rule competent to be brought within federal jurisdiction. There are also
many industries on a purely state basis. Further, the federal court, although having jurisdiction over industrial disputes, sometimes refrains from settling such disputes preferring to leave
the matter to the state tribunals. Again, in some of the "higher wage" states, such as Queensland and New South Wales, the state branches of federal unions are successful in inducing the
federal union to make demands upon employers in the rest of Australia only, leaving conditions in the remaining two states to be dealt with by the state laws and state industrial tribunals. From all these sources there arises an extensive jurisdiction still exercised by some of the
state tribunals-particularly in New South Wales and Queensland.
32 12 C.A.R. 181.
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example of the New South Wales legislation considerably influenced Mr.
Justice Higgins. Subsequently, in 1925, the Labor government restored
the forty-four hour week in New South Wales, and the federal court was
induced to accept the new standard, being, according to one authority,
influenced "by the knowledge that, in some of the Australian States, the
forty-four hours working week was largely in operation."33
The fact that in some States there is still a large field for the operation
of State awards has tended to produce some overlapping between the
jurisdiction of federal and State arbitrators. For a time, this matter assumed considerable importance, and in 1929, the federal government proposed to withdraw altogether from the field of industrial arbitration,
leaving the States exclusive control over industrial disputes except in two
or three special industries. The proposal was defeated by an overwhelming popular majority and from that day up to the present it may fairly be
said that all political parties accept the principle of federal arbitration in
relation to interstate industrial disputes.
So far as the States are concerned, the systems vary considerably, but
the New South Wales tribunal, though now called an industrial "commission" instead of an industrial "court" and although its jurisdiction
extends to industrial matters without the necessity of establishing an actual dispute, still functions in very much the same way as the original
tribunal of i9oi. For all practical purposes, the trade union, registered as
an industrial union, remains the unit recognized by the court as the sole
agent or representative of the workers for the purposes of conciliation or
arbitration. The State system works smoothly enough. For one thing, the
company union, or "scab union" as it has been called is non-existent. If
the court finds that a union is in any way controlled by employers it will
not accord it recognition as an industrial union. Nor is there any real
difficulty in the rivalry of bonafide trade unions. Here there is very little
overlapping. But there may be an industrial union which covers all trades,
occupations and crafts within an industry, while the craft unions, or some
of them, still survive. In such a case an employee is not bound to choose
between the unions. He may belong to both. When the industrial matter
comes before the court, both industrial and craft unions (as well as the
employers) may, in an appropriate case, be heard. In the Victorian system, on the other hand, the old principles have survived. Unionism plays
little part in the operation of the wages boards with the result that there is
an increasing tendency for trade unions to seek relief in the federal
jurisdiction.
33

Foenander, Towards Industrial Peace in Australia 249 (1937).
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While lecturing in the United States in 1938, ! was frequently asked
how it was possible for a court to fix reasonable wages and conditions of
labor. The assumption was that because it had not been done in the
United States, it could not be done at all. One general answer is to refer
such questioners to the many Australian volumes of printed reports containing the awards of federal and State arbitrators during the past thirtyfive years, almost every award being accompanied by a statement of the
reasons why the wage has beeil prescribed,
The volumes of reports to which I have referred will show clearly that
just as it is possible to fix reasonable prices for railway fares and freights or
nuliquidated damages in courts of law, so is it possible to fix reasonable
wages. In neither case is there any a prioriimpossibility. In each case the
tribunal should have sound imagination as well as a thorough knowledge
of the conditions existing throughout the trades and industries of the
country. Agitur eundo if the court makes a mistake, it is always competent for it to make a suitable adjustment, Nor is there any particular
difficulty in enforcing the awards of the court. By this I do not mean that
strikes and lockouts are unknown. They will never be unknown in democratic countries where true freedom of association exists and where a
tribunal has failed, or seems to have failed to redress a burning grievance.
But the ordinary case of enforcement arises where an employer has failed
to pay the prescribed wages or to observe some expressed industrial condition, e.g., preference to unionists. In such cases the employer is proceeded
against, either before the industrial tribunals or before the ordinary courts
of the land, and orders for payment or penalties may be made,
I have no wish to overstate the advantages achieved by the arbitration
tribunals in Australia. So much depends upon the particular arbitrator.
In some respects, certainly, the departure of Mr. Justice Higgins from the
federal court greatly weakened its authority. It no longer even claims for
itself the emancipating ideal which Higgins always pursued. An analysis
of the calculations strongly suggests that it is by no means certain that the
existing "basic wage" is in all respects the equivalent of the Harvester
standard fixed in 1907 by Mr. Justice Higgins. During the depression in
193i, the basic standard which Higgins had declared "sacrosanct" was
reduced by ten per cent. Although this standard was subsequently said to
be completely restored, the method of adjustment was very complex, and
it seems to me that the present standard is slightly lower than that existing in 1907 although the actual money figure is, of course, higher.
Therefore it may be conceded that neither the Federal nor the State
system of wage fixation by industrial arbitrators has fulfilled all the hopes

CONTROL OF LA3OR RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA
of earlier days. While the general standard of living has improved, little
or nothing has been done to remove the great bane of the working class,
their insecurity of tenure of employment. Moreover, during the World
War, and for some time thereafter, the workers did not receive from the
tribunals a wage which compensated them for the rapid increases in the
cost of living. On the other hand, the Australian system has undoubtedly
taken reasonable care of the lowest paid workers and has done much to
prevent sweating in certain industries, especially in those employing
women and children. Owing to the continuous control by the tribunals,
there has never been any absolute line of demarcation between the unskilled and the skilled workers. In the usual case the same industrial
union protects the interests of both.
The fairest way of testing the position is to ask, what would have happened in Australia in the absence of the wage fixing tribunals? The result
might well have been disastrous. In the "low wage" States the undoubted
tendency would have been to reduce the workers' standards to a lower
level. Faced with the unfair competition which would have resulted (because of interstate free-trade) employers in the "high wage" States
would have demanded equalization of conditions. There would have been
very great industrial upheavals, and no one can be dogmatic as to the
consequences. In all probability, the Federal tribunal has prevented great
evils. More positively it has contributed to the successful unionization of
labor, especially in the "low wage" States or where the State wage regulation is based entirely upon the Wages Board system. Gradually, by its
awards, the federal tribunal has created an Australian standard, which,
though in strict law applicable only to interstate disputes, is usually
recognized in practice by almost every State tribunal. In a "low wage"
State any tendency to lower an'existing standard has usually resulted in
the creation of interstate disputes which are settled by the federal tribunal
in an award which elevates the standard in the "low wage" State at least
to the prevailing federal level.
From a constitutional point of view federal control of labor relations in
Australia presents a very interesting contrast to the position in the
United States where the federal jurisdiction over labor relations has been
based upon the power to regulate interstate commerce. As will have been
noted, a similar law making power over commerce is vested in the Commonwealth Parliament, but no attempt has yet been made to exercise the
power along the lines indicated by the National Labor Relations Act or
the more recent Fair Standards Act. By not exercising the trade and commerce power in Section 51 (i) and by exercising the industrial arbitration
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power in Section 51 (xxxv), the federal government of Australia has avoided direct responsibility for any unpopular federal award by saying that the
matter is exclusively one for the constitutional arbitrator, not for Parliament itself.
In the United States the fundamental principle of the National Labor
Relations Act is the right of association and of collective bargaining declared by Section 7- While this right is not in terms declared by any Australian statute, it undoubtedly exists and is more easily enforced because,
for all practical purposes, only the bona fide trade union is empowered to
act on behalf of the workers by invoking the jurisdiction of the federal
arbitrator. In Australia, it is useless for an employer to refuse to bargain
with or recognize the trade union, for the latter may by appropriate action
seek and obtain the award of an independent tribunal. If an employer
discriminates against a trade union, the tribunal may order the employer
to give preference of employment to the members of the union. So with
unfair labor practices. While Australian statutes do not define "unfair
labor practice" in terms corresponding to Section 8 of the National Labor
Relations Act, the industrial tribunals will readily suppress or even punish
similar conduct.
Further the federal tribunal in Australia is now freed from any control
by the courts as to the manner in which it exercises its jurisdiction. There
is never any review of the facts and the law is reviewable only occasionally
and in collateral proceedings. Thus Australia now accepts the principle
that in essence the regulation of labor relations by industrial arbitration
tribunals pertains to the administrative function, and in its very nature
is incapable of review by courts of law whose competence to deal with such
delicate matters of administration is seldom even asserted.
There are two very interesting parallels between what is happening in
the United States today and what used to happen in the industrial courts
of Australia thirty years ago. The first is this. No doubt as a result of
the statutory method of enforcement of the decisions of the National
Labor Relations Board, almost many decisions of that body, even as to
the facts, will be re-examined in the federal courts. In industrial matters
the delay that is thus caused is disastrous, because the great value of
State intervention in labor disputes is the speed and finality of such intervention. Subjecting such administrative decisions to the uncertainty and
delay of ordinary litigation imposes an unfair burden upon employers and
employees alike. Similar delays were caused during the earlier years of the
Australian federal tribunal when the employers always resorted to the
High Court as the controlling judicial authority.

CONTROL OF LABOR RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA

Another point of resemblance is, I think, of even greater importance.
For some years after the Australian arbitration tribunals were created, unsatisfactory conditions of employment in some industries were exposed as
a result of public investigations based upon sworn evidence and followed by
convincing, not to say devastating, findings of unfair practices. Similarly
the National Labor Relations Board, during the few years of its existence,
has by painstaking investigation proved the existence of unfair practices
in a number of American industries. In Australia exposure and publicity
helped to stamp out the abuses by informing and helping to create a
powerful public opinion. The National Labor Relations Board's reports
should have a similar effect in the United States for the evidence and
findings contained in some of their reports should, and will, I doubt not,
make all Americans blush with shame and indignation. For sheer brutality some of the practices described in one or two cases are without
parallel, certainly in Australia, and probably in any English speaking
country. 34 Indeed the exposures contained in the judgment of the Board
in.the Republic Steel Corporationcase raise questions of civil right which
are far more fundamental than the mere improvement of labor conditions.
Even though the legal profession in the United States does not share the
opinion of distinguished lawyers in Australia that anarchy in labor relations should give place to law and order, still it should at least assist in the
actual defence of those human rights and civil liberties the protection of
which is said to be effectively guaranteed by the United States Constitution. For those who might desire the point to be elaborated, I merely refer
to the moving utterance of Mr. Grenville Clark 3s in his recent address on
"Conservatism and Civil Liberty."
I venture one prophecy only. When the people of the United States are
as far removed in point of time as we in Australia are today removed from
the passing of the early industrial arbitration legislation, most of them
will look back upon the pioneer work of the National Labor Relations
Board as Australians now recall the decisions of Mr. Justice Higgins,
clarum et venerabile nomen.
e.g., Matter of Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (1938).
3sAddress at the annual meeting of the Nassau County Bar Ass'n (Mineola, N.Y., June ii,
1938).
34 See,

